

NOTES

1. I am indebted to the comments of John Hall, Albert Craig, and Robert Ward in my organization of the themes expressed in this Introduction, and to Ronald Morse and the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution for providing the venue at which these themes were first presented. Responsibility for the ideas contained herein, however, is of course solely my own.
2. Osamu Oba, "The Role of Imported Chinese Books in the Tokugawa to Meiji Transition," unpublished ms., Kansai University, April 1982.
3. For a study of this phenomenon see Kenneth Pyle, *The New Generation in Meiji Japan* (Stanford, 1969).
4. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *Pearl Harbor as History* (New York, 1973); James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy* (Princeton, 1966).
5. John Potter, *Yamamoto* (New York, 1965), pp. 128ff.
6. *The Nobility of Failure* (New York, 1975).
7. This position—that unequivocally racist images pervaded, preexisted, and powerfully survived the war period—is most forcefully argued by John Dower in *War Without Mercy* (New York, 1986).

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RIVAL STATES ON A LOOSE REIN: THE NEGLECTED TRADITION OF APPEASEMENT IN LATE TOKUGAWA JAPAN

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Five decades into the nineteenth century most Japanese knew little of the world beyond their shores. They were prohibited from setting foot outside their homeland, and so could not obtain first-hand information on contemporary events or world geography. Instead they had to rely on foreign writings to accumulate knowledge in those areas. Earlier in their history, the Japanese had gained some knowledge of Western affairs from contacts with Europeans during Japan's "Christian century," from roughly 1550 to 1650. Later, they had access to many seventeenth and eighteenth century Jesuit writings translated into Chinese. In addition, Dutch trading post officials periodically submitted written reports to the *bakufu* (the Tokugawa Shogunal government) in Edo on world conditions. And by the early nineteenth century, Japanese students of Dutch Learning had attained high levels of skill in translating Dutch materials and assimilating Western knowledge.

Even so, inquisitive late-Tokugawa Japanese were still gaining surprisingly large amounts of vital information on Western affairs from Chinese sources—Jesuit works translated into Chinese, Ch'ing studies of Western conditions, and written or oral reports tendered by Chinese merchants coming to trade at Nagasaki. Until 1860, when the bakufu formally renounced its policy of national isolation and sent modern Japan's first mission abroad, the Japanese probably learned more about Western affairs from China than from the West directly.¹

Western knowledge gained from Chinese and Dutch sources was often outdated and incorrect. But this does not lessen its historical importance, for late Tokugawa thinkers applied that knowledge (accurate or not) to alter radically their strategic thinking and to discard long-cherished values and institutions. As we shall see, one important such thinker, Aizawa Seishisai (1781-1863) of the Later Mito School, learned of the American Revolution from *Kon'yo zushiki* (1845), a Japanese compilation of translated Dutch source materials, and from a Japanese edition of Wei Yuan's *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* (1847). This new knowledge led him to revise drastically his earlier view of the world and international relations.

Men such as Aizawa relied largely on traditional Chinese conceptions of the world order when they defined Japan's position *vis-a-vis* foreign states. But they had more than one "traditional" Chinese conception to draw on. In periods of strength, as under the Ch'ing dynasty, the Chinese deemed their empire the Middle Kingdom. According to this Middle Kingdom world view, well-known to us through the work of John Fairbank,² China was conscious of her superiority in wealth and strength to foreign barbarian peoples. In such eras, the Chinese treated foreign peoples as tributary subjects and forced them to accept indignities such as performing the kowtow. On the level of pure rhetoric or state ideology, many Tokugawa Japanese styled their *own* land the Middle Kingdom, and relegated Westerners to the role of barbarians. But when forced to deal realistically with Western nations who sought trade and diplomatic intercourse after 1853, many Japanese including Aizawa adopted a different set of diplomatic protocols derived from another school of Chinese statecraft: the "China among equals" world view which better suited Japan as a small, weak power.³

Too often we assume that East Asian states lacked rules for diplomatic intercourse.⁴ But in China's Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.), there was a multi-state system of alliances centered on the Chou house at first, and on hegemonies such as Dukes Huan of Ch'i and Wen of Chin later on. In the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.), powerful autonomous kingdoms combined war with diplomacy to make or break interstate alliances. Even in later periods of centralized empire, China was not always strong enough to dominate foreigners in Middle Kingdom fashion, and often had to treat barbarian states as equal partners under treaties concluded to secure mutual concessions. In dealing with the Hsiung-nu in 51 B.C., for example, the Han emperor accorded the Hsiung-nu chieftain all the respect due to the head of a "rival state" (Ch. *ti kuo*, J. *tekkoku*), one of roughly equal power and status. Though nominally barbarians, the Hsiung-nu were not to be treated as inferiors or as a subject people. The Han

emperor concluded a treaty of "peace and mutual conciliation" (Ch. *ho chin*, J. *washin*), and was careful that "the Han dynasty will not be the party to commit a fault first." The Han kept the Hsiung-nu on a "loose rein" (Ch. *chi mi*, J. *kimi*), "so that the blame of being crooked would always be on them."⁵ According to the rules of this traditional diplomatic protocol, China was obliged to keep good faith and adhere scrupulously to treaty provisions. Aizawa drew on this "rival states" concept of diplomacy to formulate his policies of barbarian control.

In this chapter I will examine these two themes in late Tokugawa Japan between China and the West: 1) the rival states view of world order and loose rein diplomacy of appeasement that Aizawa adopted from early Chinese history to enable bakufu leaders to deal with the foreign threat in the years 1825 to 1863; and 2) how knowledge of the West, especially of American independence, gained from Dutch and Chinese sources forced him to promote a policy of opening Japan to the West within this tradition of Chinese diplomatic practices.

Pre-Opium War: A World of Rival States

The Edo bakufu first learned of America's independence in 1809, one year after the humiliating *Phaeton* Incident at Nagasaki Bay. For many years bakufu magistrates in Nagasaki had suspected that some Western ships calling there were not really Dutch. Their crews spoke a different language, and their logs revealed that they were registered in places like "Boston new [sic] England." In short, merchant ships from Britain's colony of "New England" and warships from the mother country were masquerading as Dutch vessels and coming to Japan in clear violation of bakufu law. In 1808, sailors from the *Phaeton*, a British man-of-war flying the Dutch flag, abducted a Dutchman in the custody of Japanese officials, one of whom haplessly fell overboard during the scuffle. To atone for this disgrace, a Nagasaki magistrate named Matsudaira Yasuhide committed suicide.⁶

This *Phaeton* Incident prompted the bakufu to gather information on "New England." It ordered two interpreters, Ishibashi Sukezaemon and Motoki Shozzaemon, to interrogate the Dutch on Dejima. They did so for several weeks, and reported to Edo that the territory known as "North America" had fought Britain successfully from 1775 to 1781 and set itself up as an "independent land" (*jiritsu no tochi*). The "states" chose the government's leaders; and two of them, "Washington and Jefferson," had won renown. In fact, the nation's new capital was named after Washington. The report ended, "We have no recent books which tell the history of this event [America's independence]. So to substantiate it, we hereby submit silver coins minted of late in America."⁷

Only the highest of bakufu officials were privy to this

fascinating information--and they soon forgot it. When the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, European naval confrontations in East Asia ceased, and active bakufu interest in contemporary Western affairs lapsed. Until the 1840s, informed Japanese such as Otsuki Gentaku, Aizawa Seishisai, Watanabe Kazan, and Takano Choei continued to believe that North America was under English control. Aizawa wrote in his *New Theses (Shinron)* of 1825: "the country they call America is located at the rear end of the world, and so its inhabitants are stupid and incompetent." He clearly did not mar his invective with faint praise of America; nor did he believe America to be a land of any importance. But this disdain for America in 1825 stood in stark contrast to his admiration for other Western nations. Although he denigrated them as "barbarians," his rational analysis of objective world affairs discloses a healthy respect for the West.

In *New Theses*, Aizawa compared the Seven Great Empires he perceived in his day to the Seven Great Kingdoms in China's Warring States era (403-221 B.C.); that is, he likened Russia to Ch'in, Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) to Ch'i, the Mogul Empire to Han, Persia to Wei, the Ch'ing Empire to Ch'u, and Japan to Chou. The seventh power, Germany (the Holy Roman Empire), was no longer strong; and so he ranked her aside lesser powers such as France, Britain, and Spain. Through these comparisons Aizawa revealed his true assessment of Japan's international standing: she was analogous to Chou, an exalted but tiny kingdom whose precarious existence hinged on the tolerance of other, greater powers. He compared Russia to Ch'in, the ruthless unifier of ancient China. Russia, Turkey, and Ch'ing China were the world's greatest powers for him in 1825; they would decide the upcoming struggle for global supremacy. Aizawa also realized that even lesser powers such as Britain and Spain enjoyed a clear edge over Japan in precious metals and raw materials owing to their possession of overseas colonies.

Russia, though having suffered serious military setbacks on her Western front, remained the world's most powerful empire and was building up strength for a final drive to unify the world by subduing her long-standing nemesis, Turkey. But before doing that, Aizawa believed, she would try to dispose of the Ch'ing on her eastern front. To do this, she first would use Christianity to win over the Ezo territories north of Japan in concert with her British and Spanish allies, who were striving to capture Pacific islands to Japan's south. Russia and Britain then would subvert Japan proper by Christianizing her "stupid commoners" and suborn a new generation of Japanese pirates (*wako*) to attack and weaken China. With China so crippled, Russia could deliver the knock-out blow from the north. Aizawa's 1825 analysis reduced Japan to little more than a pawn in Russia's

chess game of world conquest; indeed, Japan's national security depended on the Ch'ing and Ottoman Empires' allying to check Russia on the Eurasian continent.⁸

Aizawa's sources of information on world affairs in 1825 predated the Napoleonic era. For him the French Empire was unheard of, the United States still belonged to Britain, and the Mogul Empire (dead by 1757) was one of the world's seven great powers. In sum, his knowledge of current events was faulty. But he used that faulty knowledge in an innovative way, and contrasts with contemporary Ch'ing thinkers bear this out. Aizawa portrayed the world's nations, including Japan, as "rival states." Although he did not actually use this traditional Chinese term, *ti kuo*, he easily could have. Three foreign powers were stronger than Japan, and only balance of power alliances--"barbarians used to control other barbarians" in traditional Chinese strategic thinking--allowed Japan to remain independent. In 1825, Aizawa compared the world situation to that of China's Warring States era, a comparison that Hsu Chi-yu (1795-1873) only implied in 1848.⁹ Aizawa likened Russia to Ch'in, an analogy that Wang T'ao (1828-1897) did not draw explicitly until the mid-1870s; and even then, Wang excluded China from the seven-power scenario.¹⁰ This shows that Aizawa, from early on, realistically and keenly perceived Japan's weakness in a harsh world of competing states.

In his conception of national strength, too, Aizawa was ahead of his time. He knew that Western nations had been small and weak until they had begun to embark on extensive overseas expansion in the recent past. The true secret behind this sudden and massive expansion, he believed, was the ability of Russian, British, and Spanish sovereigns to instill active allegiance in their own and in foreign peoples by propagating their state cult of Christianity. Shrewd European rulers such as Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) had won Aizawa's admiration as early as 1801:

He devoted all his energies to stabilizing the people's livelihood and enriching the nation. He achieved great things indeed. He planted vineyards and orchards to secure enough food for his people. He established schools to propagate the official religion. He drilled Russia's army, and with it, struck terror in the hearts of her foes.¹¹

Such European leaders exploited the potency of religious rituals as part of government. They were similar to the Sage Kings of antiquity, and Christianity was deceptively similar to the Confucian Way. Although Christianity was a wicked perversion of the Sages' Way, it was just as effective in winning popular submission, both at

home and abroad. As such, it was a perfect instrument of expansion. Aizawa quoted a Ming anti-Christian polemicist, Su Chi-yu, to the effect that:

The Western barbarians are adept at the ways of intrigue. Whenever they arrive in a country, it is doomed because they conquer it from within, by recruiting the local inhabitants into their ranks. Over thirty nations have fallen in this way.¹²

Through Christian subversion, Aizawa held, Western leaders practiced a key dictum from the *Sun Tzu*: to take over enemy states intact, so that the conquering forces suffered no casualties and the conquered peoples provided conscripts for still more foreign conquests. So Christianity permitted European rulers to annex territories and control populations far larger than their own. For Aizawa, the foreign threat Japan faced in 1825 was mainly ideological, not military. Russia, England, and Spain were scheming to beguile Japanese subjects into subverting the bakufu and the feudal lords' (*daimyo*) domains; then they could recruit Japanese forces to help subdue China. To combat this danger from abroad, Japan had to strengthen itself by adopting Western ships and weapons. But more importantly, it first had to win the hearts and minds of its own people, so that they would remain devoted to their feudal rulers rather than join the enemy's ranks.

Before the 1840s, enlightened Japanese thinkers including Aizawa, Watanabe Kazan, and Takano Choei, subscribed generally to this world view of "rival states."¹³ They believed Japan to be a third-rate power--a pawn to help knock over the Westerners' real target, Ch'ing China. Even so, Aizawa was convinced that they would not attempt a direct, massive invasion of Japan as the Mongols once had; instead they would try to win Japan over through Christianity and the lure of trade. They would alienate Japanese commoners from their rulers and foment rebellions similar to the Buddhist-inspired *Ikko ikki* earlier in Japan's history. Aizawa's xenophobia was class-bound and resembled that of the contemporary Ch'ing ruling elite: he feared foreign-inspired insurrections within Japan more than direct foreign invasions. He did not fear a Western military presence--or even the granting of privileges to foreigners--in Japan as such. What he feared was that aggrieved Japanese commoners and low-ranking warriors (*samurai*) or hostile vassals of the Shogun (Outside Lords or *tozama daimyo*) would take advantage of the foreign presence to rebel and overthrow the bakufu.

Given this type of indirect foreign threat, the bakufu's best

long-range policy for national defense was to emulate astute Western leaders who used Christianity as a state religion. Edo leaders should have the Emperor in Kyoto perform Shinto rituals as part of a state cult designed to create national unity and integration, or *kokutai*. In 1825 Aizawa assumed that the Western powers would not attack Japan in force; and during the 1820s and 1830s objective conditions in East Asia bore him out. The *Phaeton* Incident was a repercussion of the Napoleonic Wars in far-off Europe. After 1808, the main violators of Japan's territorial waters were unarmed Western whalers and merchant ships, not warships. Moreover, in 1825 when Aizawa wrote *New Theses*, the Industrial Revolution had yet to tip the technological scales decisively in Europe's favor. So Westerners brandished no overwhelmingly superior weapons in East Asia. The armed expulsion of Westerners was fully within Japan's power; it made perfect sense in the first third of the nineteenth century. Not until the decade and a half between the outbreak of the Opium War and Perry's visits to Edo Bay did world conditions force Japanese strategists either to revise their traditional view of international relations or to alter their policies of armed expulsion and national isolation.

From the Opium War to Perry and Harris

Japanese strategists tended to interpret the Opium War (1839-42) in two ways. A few men such as Takashima Shuhan (1798-1866) were willing to believe Dutch reports about the conflict which stressed that England's superior weapons accounted for its overwhelming victories. But many more men, such as Torii Yozo (1804-74), dismissed Takashima's uncritical acceptance of Britain's reputed victories. The Dutch reports were wildly exaggerated, Torii believed. Preferring to trust Chinese accounts, he came away with quite a different picture. One account out of Chapu dated the twelfth lunar month of 1841, for example, glossed over Chinese defeats and hinted that the real fight had just begun:

although they have fire-wheel boats [steamships], these cannot navigate our inland rivers and run aground on mud flats. If we work up a rage and dispatch Heavenly Warriors, how can we fail to annihilate them?¹⁴

When we consider how Japanese strategists had tended to assess world affairs up to then, the Chinese reports doubtless seemed the more plausible. Many saw England as a second-class power--strong, but still weaker than Russia, Turkey, and Ch'ing China. Even if England had won a few hit-and-run coastal skirmishes, so what? And since bakufu law still forbade foreign travel, no Japanese might

actually witness the conflict in China first-hand to confirm or disprove either version of its outcome. When similarly distorted and confusing hearsay accounts of the Taiping Rebellion reached Japan in the early 1850s, many clear-thinking Japanese concluded (rightly or not) that Christianity and trafficking in opium had produced China's woes. Had not these two evils, both brought by Westerners, undermined China's national unity and strength by creating treachery, piracy, and rebellion within? Such internal weakness, not inferior weapons, had stymied Ch'ing efforts to control the foreign barbarians and preserve China's territorial integrity.

Such news out of China during the 1840s and early 1850s, before the coming of Perry, provided a stern warning to politically-active Japanese. In response to it, most of them reaffirmed the bakufu's policies of national isolation (*sakoku*) and armed expulsion (*joi*). One Western observer in Japan during the 1860s explained why xenophobia had been so popular and compelling in the 1850s:

Nor can it be wondered that Japan ... which had seen the humiliation of China consequent upon disputes with a Western Power arising out of trade questions at the very moment when she was being torn by a civil war which owed its origin to the introduction of new religious beliefs from the West, should have believed that the best means of maintaining peace at home and avoiding an unequal contest with Europe, was to adhere strictly to the traditions of the past two centuries [*sakoku* and *joi*].¹⁵

Like many Japanese of the 1840s and early 1850s, Aizawa welcomed the crisis next door. For him it was a long-hoped-for stimulus to provoke reform and reinvigoration among complacent bakufu and domain officials. In *Kagaku jigen* (1847), his opus written after having learned of events on the Asian mainland, Aizawa observed:

As Mencius said, "A nation facing no rival states or danger from abroad (*tekkoku gaikan*) will perish." Thus the sages used [the pretext of] rival states and foreign danger to boost military strength, subdue barbarians, and consolidate rule at home. Here is our chance to turn foreign danger into good fortune.¹⁶

After the Opium War Aizawa obtained new, more up-to-date information on world affairs from two important sources. One was *Kon'yo zushiki*, translated and compiled by Mitsukuri Gempo

(1799-1863) and Mitsukuri Shogo (1821-46).¹⁷ The other was "Amerika soki," a section from Wei Yuan's *Hai-kuo t'u-chih*, translated and edited by Hirose Tatsutaro, a samurai from Yodo domain.¹⁸ Wei Yuan (1794-1856), noted late Ch'ing statecraft reformer, was the compiler of *Sheng-wu chi* (*Records of Imperial Achievements*) and *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* (*Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms*).¹⁹ Aizawa was one of many late Tokugawa thinkers and leaders who read these two Chinese works in the original or in Japanese editions.

New knowledge gained from *Kon'yo zushiki* and *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* did much to reshape Aizawa's picture of world power alignments in *Kagaku jigen*. Out went the Mogul Empire and Persia; now the first-class world powers were Russia, the Ch'ing, England, and Turkey, followed by Germany, France, Spain, and Prussia.²⁰ But Aizawa noted that the Ch'ing had been on a long decline, Germany remained an empire in name only, and Turkey and Prussia did not engage in overseas expansion. So he concluded that "Britain, Russia, and to a lesser degree, France, are the powers seeking to conquer foreign lands."²¹ These were the powers Japan would have to contend with thereafter. Unlike Ch'ing thinkers and leaders, the Japanese worried little about continental foes. The Japanese readily perceived the threat posed by maritime European powers because no steppe nomadic tribes had attacked Japan after the thirteenth century.

But Aizawa also learned of European maritime weaknesses. He was heartened to find that Western empire-builders had lost their magic touch: they could no longer "cherish men from afar," a stock Confucian phrase usually used to describe how the Chinese Son of Heaven won control over foreign peoples and territories.²² Aizawa discovered much evidence of popular rebellion in colonial areas throughout the world, and he assumed this to mean that oppressed native peoples everywhere aspired to cast off the yoke of European domination:

finally, rebellions have occurred in the states of India. In North America, Washington has risen to expel the English, and in South America, Bolivar has risen to expel the Spanish. Chile and other states have followed suit; all have become independent nations.²³

The emergence of these free independent states, known to Aizawa as "republics" (*kyowaseijishu*) through Mitsukuri's translation, altered his strategic thinking drastically.²⁴ And from his class-bound, pro-bakufu standpoint, this brought new hope. A close analysis of how Aizawa construed the American Revolution and its world-wide political ramifications will show his grounds for optimism on the eve

of Perry's visits.²⁵

By the Gembun and Kampo eras (1736-44), according to Aizawa, Britain's North American colonies had begun to achieve prosperity in trade and agriculture. This prompted the rapacious English king to raise taxes levied in the colonies so that he could better finance his wars. He was then buying tea from China, transporting it to North America in royal English ships, and selling it to the colonists. He decided that taxing the tea sellers alone did not raise enough revenue, so he tried to tax buyers as well; the Americans refused to pay. His measure met boycotts and armed opposition in South Carolina, Virginia, and New York. The colonists excluded English tea ships from colonial ports, and one night a group of aborigines who had sided with the colonists stormed an English ship and threw its tea cargo overboard. Angered, the English king sent more warships, and he imposed a new tax twice as high. The Americans, hating his greed and violence, vowed to resist to the death.

In 1774, the elders of each colony met in Virginia. Both the aborigines and immigrant peoples agreed to make peace (end the French and Indian Wars?). They petitioned the English king for redress of grievances: to withdraw his armed forces and to restore the old order under which only tea sellers, not buyers, paid taxes. But quite to the contrary, the king sent still more troopships to invade the colonies. His forces burned city walls and looted. Such greed and violence enraged the Americans. Their elders secretly met and agreed that each colony should recruit men and build ships to be placed under the command of General Washington. Finally, on 4 July 1776 they composed a "Call to Arms" that justified their actions, and they circulated this document to all the world's nations:

The Lord-on-High (*shang t'i*) created the people, and though countless families of men exist, all are as brothers. He granted life to each and made sure that each would find peace in its proper place in the world. He was greatly worried that the mighty would overpower the weak, the many would oppress the few, and stupid commoners would come to live like the birds and beasts unless properly edified. That is why he established sovereigns to protect the peoples. The Lord-on-High did not establish sovereigns so that they might work violence against their peoples or make their peoples into servitors. Our land, America, had never had a ruler. But when the English king came here, he made himself king, and our people, his subjects. Our people were delighted because they believed he meant to love and protect us, not harm us. Had the king's

administration been without grave evils, we would remain subject to him even now. But he has not been content to oppress us once; he has oppressed us repeatedly.... This we can tolerate no longer....

When the king realized that the thirteen colonies were united against him, he sent a huge fleet of troopships to invade them. The two sides fought to a standoff for over a year. France sent forces to aid the colonists, but the war dragged on for six or seven years, involving 160 to 170 warships and 600,000 to 700,000 men.

In 1784, the English king finally realized that victory was not to be had, and he sent his minister to seek peace. But the colonists were distrustful. They knew that France would withdraw her forces, American soldiers would return to their farms, and Washington would retire to his estate. The British might violate the peace and try to retake the colonies by force during this period of weakness. The American elders also knew that their land had no ruler, so no one would settle disputes or handle litigation. They decided to establish a leader and laws, so that their country would be forever at peace and in order. They had the foresight to realize that, although this leader might rule well during his own lifetime, his descendants might be inept or derelict, or they might become tyrants; then the country would fall to disorder. The leaders met in Virginia in the spring of 1788 to devise some solution to this problem. They elected Washington to be President and decided that after he died, a worthy successor should be chosen every four years based on popular opinion. Each elder went home to deliberate with his people, and returned the next year to ratify these resolutions.

So America, which Aizawa in 1825 had derided as a land of foolish barbarians, had become a power to be reckoned with. He discovered that this resolute colonial people, led by the heroic Washington, had fought England to a standoff for eight long years and forced that world power to sue for peace. What is more, he discovered that other colonies in North America had joined the original thirteen: California and Mexico had revolted from Spain and joined the United States.²⁶ America's population stood at 28 million; it surpassed Japan's 25 million.²⁷

The conclusions from all this were clear to Aizawa and many like-minded Japanese. Granted, the English had inflicted defeats on Ch'ing China in a series of lightning-fast raids against a disunited, apathetic rabble. But China's humiliations stemmed in truth from domestic weaknesses. The American Revolutionary War seemed to show that the English could not win a protracted land war in countries where the entire people resolutely supported and fought for

their leaders. The mighty Europeans were vulnerable to popular revolutions in their colonies all over the globe. Since the Westerners' strength supposedly came from their ability to enlist such native colonial peoples in foreign campaigns, Aizawa could logically conclude that world-wide independence movements were seriously undermining European imperial powers such as England. The Opium War showed that the bakufu had to cultivate domestic strength and national integration by forging bonds of loyalty between itself and the daimyo, samurai, and commoner classes. Aizawa believed that it could accomplish this by exploiting the Emperor as a potent, unifying religious symbol. The popular unity so created at home, coupled with the rising power of newly liberated republics such as America, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and others, would forestall Western incursions in Japan. In this sense, his understanding of current events reinforced his traditional rival states world view, and he had high hopes that the newly independent barbarian peoples would offset and curb old established barbarian nations. But this optimism was shattered when Commodore Matthew C. Perry forced his way into Edo Bay in the summer of 1853.

Perry, Harris, and the Opening of Japan

On this first visit, Perry forced the bakufu to accept letters from President Millard Fillmore and himself which called for an end to Japan's seclusion. He threatened to return the next year for a favorable reply, and made good his threat seven months later commanding one-quarter of the United States Navy. Edo was indecisive about how to deal with the Americans. Tokugawa Nariaki, the daimyo of Mito, served the bakufu as a special advisor on coastal defense. As a collateral house of the Shogun, Mito enjoyed great prestige; and Nariaki, a vigorous and able reformer, was a popular opinion-leader among daimyo and samurai. On his order, Aizawa composed replies to Perry and Fillmore in classical Chinese.²⁸ Although never delivered, these two letters are historically significant. They tell us how Aizawa the xenophobe tried to convince foreign states that Edo's policy of seclusion was just, and failing in that, why he eventually came to advocate opening Japan to the West. Aizawa consistently formulated his ideas within the traditional Chinese rival states framework and argued for a loose rein policy of mollifying Westerners through peace treaties and bilateral concessions.

Aizawa sought to refute the two key points Perry made in his letter to the bakufu.²⁹ First, Perry claimed that Japanese officials and commoners treated shipwrecked Americans as if they were enemies, in contrast to the humane treatment given shipwrecked Japanese in America; and he insisted that a treaty of peace and amity

(*washin*) would rectify this problem. Second, he argued that present-day world conditions made the bakufu's policy of seclusion anachronistic and unworkable; so the United States and Japan could avert an unfriendly collision only by concluding such a treaty. The redoubtable Aizawa countered by asserting that Japan was *not* in seclusion: at Nagasaki Japan had an official reception point for representatives of foreign nations seeking to relay messages to the bakufu.³⁰ Most foreign vessels coming to Japan in recent years were not shipwrecked at all; they came to ports *other than* Nagasaki under their own power. Nagasaki was like the gate to a private home: it was there for anyone with legitimate business to enter, and anyone intruding elsewhere deserved to be treated as an enemy.

Aizawa came up with a more involved argument to rebut Perry's second point. The times may have changed, he granted, but the Will of Heaven--that every ruler bring peace and stability to his people--was immutable. Quoting from the *Book of Rites*, he declared: "Good faith needs no covenants," and went on to state that concluding a treaty of peace and amity with America would bring disorder and suffering to Japan's people--the very opposite of what Perry claimed to be seeking. A genuine desire to preserve peace and amity, not the treaty itself, was what mattered:

If you really come in peace, you will not wish to cause death and destruction; that is what you would do to those you hate. To bring death to our people would be to lack benevolence; to transform our orderly rule into chaos would be to lack righteousness. Because you too cherish your people, you would not start a war rashly disregarding benevolence and righteousness.³¹

Aizawa did not say why Perry would not wish to harm the Japanese people by forcing bakufu leaders to sign his treaty. To understand why, we must examine Aizawa's reply to Fillmore's demand for setting up regulations to govern trade and the exchange of ministers between Japan and the United States:³²

Heaven has created every land with a distinctive character. [As Mencius said,] "diversity is the proper condition of things." The Way of Heaven and Earth decrees this. Hence, some peoples traverse the seas, and some devote themselves to agriculture. These differences stem from their folkways. Alter those folkways and the people in question will lose their livelihood. And that, of course, would cause great hardship. The Japanese people have

engaged in agriculture from time immemorial. They produce only enough to meet their own needs and have nothing left over to sell to others. This is the condition Heaven has granted us; it cannot be changed.³³

Fillmore was mistaken, he continued, in assuming that southern Japan produced large amounts of coal. Japan produced just enough to meet its own needs, so there was no surplus for American ships. Fillmore's call for friendship was fine, but his proposed exchange of ministers was not. Because Heaven had forbidden the Japanese to traverse the seas, the bakufu could not send a minister to America; and that would violate proper protocol. On the other hand, if America broke bakufu laws by dispatching a minister to reside in Japan, that would stir up large-scale popular unrest and contradict Fillmore's expressed aim: not to "disturb the tranquility of the Shogun's dominions."

But most important, Aizawa argued, Westerners in centuries past had brought Christianity to Japan and fomented massive rebellions that had not been easy to quell. The Christian scourge became so deep-rooted that generations had been required to eradicate it. Should the bakufu make an exception for Fillmore and allow American consuls to reside in Japan, it would have to grant similar dispensation to other foreign nations. And those other foreigners, unlike Americans, might flout sacred bakufu laws against disseminating subversive Christian teachings.

From 1853 until his death in 1863, Aizawa would strive to bolster bakufu authority in Japan and counter foreign demands for trade and diplomacy by appealing to a Confucian-inspired theory of Heavenly Providence. Heaven, he claimed, had the best interests of all peoples in the world at heart, and it desired that they all find happiness and prosperity, each in its own distinctive way. To this end, Heaven had decreed specific cultural and economic patterns, institutions, and values "appropriate for each land."³⁴ Furthermore, Heaven had assigned rulers, "from supremely majestic emperors to lowly tribal chieftains," to all countries. Each was charged with the onerous duty of upholding the "character" peculiar to his land and ridding it of violence and disorder. Only then would every people enjoy peace and contentment; only then would everything remain in its proper condition. Heaven was impartial:

Since Heaven seeks to uphold tranquility, no one thing among its creation receives special favor to the detriment of any other. Instead, Heaven has endowed each thing with its own particular character. Things rooted in the soil, it

makes grow; things that lean to one side, it topples over. Heaven does not force creatures with hoofs to fly; it does not prompt those with wings to gallop. Heaven allows each to do what it does best, and does not force any to do what it cannot.... Likewise, some peoples live solely by the plow; others trade what they have in excess to obtain what they lack. Those too poor to supply their own needs depend on other nations; those who can, live off the produce of their lands. Either way, the ruler's task is to ensure his people's livelihood by making do with what his land has been endowed with.... No ruler tries to change his nation's character; he does not make his people accept anything they are averse to.³⁵

If Westerners would but honor this providential intent of Heaven, Aizawa claimed, there would be no wars and no need of treaties. But instead, Westerners flouted Heavenly Providence. They "judged all peoples in the world according to Western ways." They sought to force their own customs of navigation and trade on other peoples, reasoning that: "to exchange the special products of one area for those of another is to uphold Heaven's Will because different parts of the world grow different crops and produce different goods." This Western reasoning was not lost on Aizawa; nor did he deny that the Westerners had certain grounds for it: "in out-of-the-way, poorly endowed countries, the land's produce does not meet the people's needs, so they must procure goods from abroad to make up for the deficiency." But this Western claim lacked validity because it falsely assumed that uniformity, rather than diversity, was "the proper condition of things."

Aizawa seems to echo Kaempfer's *History of Japan* when he asserts that Japan enjoyed unique material blessings due to Heavenly Dispensation:³⁶ "our soil is rich, our climate fair, and our products plentiful; so we have no need to import any goods."³⁷ Heaven had made Japan perfectly self-sufficient. Levels of production and consumption matched perfectly; nothing was lacking and nothing went to waste. But Westerners, Aizawa went on, risked "upsetting this delicate balance in nature's creation." Japanese folkways were "to live off the land and drink from the well," just as Western folkways were to sail the seas and trade. "How would Westerners like it if we forced our folkways on them?" he asked.³⁸

This Confucian-inspired theory of Heavenly Providence satisfied Aizawa's two categorical imperatives. It reinforced bakufu authority at home: because Heaven had appointed the Shogun ruler of Japan, any opposition to him violated Heaven's Will. Even more importantly,

the theory gave the bakufu a clever and face-saving route of diplomatic maneuvering: because Fillmore also was a Heavenly-appointed ruler, the bakufu might properly treat him as an equal when sending or receiving diplomatic messages. Aizawa could so skirt the thorny issue of having to treat Westerners as inferior barbarians in face-to-face negotiating sessions, while continuing to denigrate them as "barbarians" in correspondence to fellow Japanese.³⁹ Aizawa derived this two-faced approach to barbarian control from the Chinese tradition of keeping rival foreign states on a loose rein by binding them to treaties of peace and mutual concession. Ch'i Ying and I-li-pu, for example, used this technique in negotiating with the British after the end of the Opium War.⁴⁰

But the tactic was poorly received in Japan. Nariaki chose not to deliver Aizawa's missives, and even if he had, they probably would not have swayed the Americans. In March of 1854, Perry forced the bakufu headed by Abe Masahiro to sign a treaty of "peace and amity" (*washin joyaku*) granting all American demands. In Mito, Aizawa was certainly displeased by this turn of events. But he never argued to abrogate the treaty once signed. Though bakufu authorities labeled it "provisional" to soften criticism at home, Aizawa saw positive value in Perry's treaty. Not only did classical traditions of statecraft sanction it, even more importantly, using the treaty was the only way to control these foreign "barbarians" given Japan's clear military inferiority to them. That is why, in the years after 1854, he would be so insistent about the reciprocity of benefits and concessions that such treaties always had been designed to guarantee.

Perry's treaty of 1854 opened two ports, Shimoda and Hakodate, to supply coal and provisions to American ships, and it ensured humane treatment for shipwrecked Americans in Japan. But true to Aizawa's fears, once the bakufu had signed a treaty with the United States granting special privileges to Americans, other Western nations demanded similar treaties and privileges--and Edo was powerless to refuse. Bakufu leaders now had no choice but to control *all* the foreign barbarians by binding them to treaty provisions. As Aizawa and the Japanese understood it, Perry's 1854 treaty was not a commercial pact and did not permit trade on a regular basis. What is more, it explicitly provided that bakufu approval be gotten before any foreign consular official might reside in Japan.

Japanese interpretations notwithstanding, however, Townsend Harris took up his post as American Consul-General at Shimoda in the summer of 1856. Among other things, Harris sought to open four ports to American trade and to secure residence for American commercial agents in Edo, Osaka, and the ports to be opened. Moreover, he insisted on presenting his demands in person to bakufu

leaders at Edo, and in the fall of 1857 an American man-of-war transported him there for that purpose despite vigorous Japanese objections. In Edo, Harris had an audience with the Shogun and delivered a personal message from President Pierce. Toward the end of 1857 he visited the home of Hotta Masayoshi, the new bakufu head who had replaced Abe in 1855. Harris lectured Hotta for two hours through Dutch and Japanese interpreters.⁴¹ He underscored the evils that British opium trafficking had produced in China and stated that the English schemed to set up an opium trade with Japan as well. Opening Japan to Western trade was inescapable, he contested. So the bakufu had better sign its first commercial treaty with the United States, a friendly nation which had refused to sell opium or wage war in China, and which would protect Japan by restraining more malevolent powers such as Britain, France, and Russia.

By early 1858, negotiations with Harris in Edo had produced a draft treaty that included all his demands. Hotta, however, would not sign it on bakufu authority alone. He feared he could not guarantee popular compliance with it unless he first gained approval from the imperial court in Kyoto. This he went to get early in March. But his task was complicated by political intrigues in Edo at the time. The heir-less Shogun Iesada was sickly and near death, and Nariaki got his son, Yoshinobu, named as one of the two candidates for succession. Nariaki schemed to achieve two related goals. First he knew that upholding seclusion was out of the question, but he wished to postpone opening the ports as long as possible so that Japan could somehow strengthen itself in the interim. Second, he sought more power for himself and Mito in bakufu councils. This he hoped to gain by playing on the court's xenophobia and forcing Hotta to support his son's candidacy. Nariaki had his followers in Kyoto goad the court into withholding approval for the Harris treaty and telling Hotta that, because this matter was vital to the nation's interests, he should consult further with the heads of the three Tokugawa collateral houses (Mito was one) and with the Outer Lords. After four vexing months in Kyoto, Hotta came to believe he could get imperial sanction for the treaty only by supporting Yoshinobu's candidacy and opening bakufu decision-making to collateral house participation.

Unable to win court approval, Hotta retired in disgrace. His willingness to accommodate the collaterals and Outside Lords had created a backlash in the bakufu that brought Ii Naosuke to power. Ii championed the cause of Tokugawa direct retainers--the *fudai* and *hatamoto*. They jealously guarded their monopoly on power in bakufu councils and refused to share it with the court or collaterals.

Ii moved to boost the bakufu's sovereign power in foreign and domestic affairs. Armed with the nativist theory of imperial

investiture--that the court had granted Tokugawa Ieyasu and his shogunal descendants full authority to govern Japan as they saw fit--Ii decided to settle the treaty issue. It was pressing. Harris was fast losing patience, and he made that clear whenever he felt the bakufu needed a little prodding. Back in January he had begun to growl that:

the President had sent me to Yedo on a most friendly mission, having solely the benefit of Japan in view; that the United States asked nothing for themselves; ... their [the bakufu's] treatment of me showed that no negotiations could be carried on with them unless the plenipotentiary was backed by a fleet, and offered them cannon balls for arguments.⁴²

Only because of this angry outburst did the bakufu start negotiating with Harris in earnest.⁴³ Harris shrewdly used this tactic throughout the following months "to bring about a crisis," as he put it.⁴⁴

His threats did not ring hollow. They gained frightful cogency when he reported that Britain and France had just defeated China in yet another war and had forced the humiliating Tientsin Treaty on the Ch'ing. With this in mind, Ii discreetly ordered that Harris' treaty be signed, and it was, on 29 July 1858. Similar treaties with Holland, Russia, Britain, and France followed; and foreign traders and officials such as British Consul-General Rutherford Alcock arrived in Japan even before the ports were to open officially. Ii also moved to silence domestic opposition. He rejected the candidacy of Nariaki's son, Yoshinobu, and declared a young boy, Yoshitomi of the Kii House, shogunal successor. For good measure, Ii also sentenced Nariaki, Matsudaira Yoshinaga, and other prominent supporters of Yoshinobu to house confinement. Because Hotta had already raised the issue of imperial sanction, Ii had felt it best to obtain court and daimyo approval for the treaty. But Harris' threats and news of the Tientsin Treaty made Ii sign before that was possible.

Harris' demands and threats, then, had forced Ii to open the nation without imperial approval; and Ii silenced the opposition through punitive measures that soon set off a bloody internecine feud in Mito.⁴⁵ One faction, the radicals, pursued Aizawa's rhetoric to "revere the emperor and expel the barbarians" literally and fanatically; another, the conservatives, discarded that rhetoric in favor of realpolitik. This cleavage largely followed age and class lines. In general, young low-ranking samurai and wealthy peasants sought to rouse bakufu leaders into executing imperial commands for the expulsion of foreigners. But contrary to their intentions, their

assassinations, coups, and insurrections ended up impairing Edo's ability to govern Japan and inviting Western armed reprisals and demands for indemnity payments. For these men, the bakufu existed to carry out the Emperor's orders; should it expire in the attempt, its glory would be all the greater.

The Mito conservatives looked on this reckless abandon with horror and repugnance. The daimyo, domain elders, and their advisors--men in positions of political responsibility--strove to uphold and strengthen the bakufu, not ruin it. Such men, Aizawa included, wanted the bakufu to retain its hegemony over the court and over potentially hostile Outside Lords. Their idea of reforming the existing national power structure was to broaden its base to include Mito, Echizen, and other collaterals plus a few Outside Lords traditionally loyal to the bakufu.

The crisis in Mito came to a head in September of 1858 when Nariaki's supporters prodded Emperor Komei and the court to issue an imperial edict that criticized the bakufu for signing the commercial treaty with Harris and for punishing Nariaki and the collaterals. It urged Ii to consult with the daimyo of the land in order to formulate effective measures to uphold domestic order and end humiliations at the hands of foreigners. The court issued this edict not only to the bakufu. It delivered the same message directly to Mito domain authorities and told them to circulate copies among the daimyo. Ii quite rightly viewed this Mito-instigated court meddling as an act of defiance to bakufu supremacy, and he purged ruthlessly all who had been opposing him. Over one hundred persons would suffer punishment--court nobles, daimyo, and activist samurai and commoners. Ii clamped down on Mito severely: Nariaki, his sons Yoshinobu and Yoshiatsu, domain elders, and several Mito samurai suffered punishments ranging from house arrest to torture and death. Ii also ordered Mito domain officials to disobey the Emperor by withholding the edict, and he demanded that Mito turn over its copy to bakufu authorities in Edo.

Aizawa and the conservatives argued to comply with bakufu orders, at least in the main, by returning the edict to the court in Kyoto, even though this meant countermanding the Emperor's will. The protesting radicals--samurai and commoners alike--encamped *en masse* at Nagaoka and Kogane on the Mito *kaido*, the main highway linking Edo and Mito. There they forcibly blocked any attempt by domain officials either to surrender the edict to Edo or return it to Kyoto. Repeated appeals to disperse resulted in bloodshed. Some of the protesters committed suicide, to resolve their dilemma of remaining loyal to both the court and bakufu while demonstrating their hostility to Ii and their own domain superiors. The radicals would not simply

obstruct Mito officials from obeying Ii's orders; they murdered Ii in late March of 1860. This act kicked off a five-year period of terror, assassination, and insurrection that ultimately proved fatal to bakufu hegemony.

Only against this background of lawlessness and unrest can we understand why Aizawa, late in life, disowned his earlier views on bakufu foreign policy and agreed to open Japan to Western trade and diplomatic intercourse. One month before his own students, admiring readers of *New Theses*, would kill Ii, Aizawa was livid in his denunciation of them:

I understand [the rebels] at Nagaoka proclaim that their actions are to "revere the emperor and expel the barbarians." But in truth they twist the meaning of those words to suit their own purposes.⁴⁶

Aizawa's memorials and letters, from 1858 to his death in 1863, show that his prime concern was to preserve bakufu and daimyo supremacy in Japan, not Japanese territorial integrity against foreign encroachment. He harped on the need for bilateral concessions under any treaty of "peace and amity" such as that signed with Perry. In 1858, for example, he proposed that this message be sent to Harris:

Treaties of peace and amity permit the states involved to remain well-ordered, and their peoples, in tranquility: only then are treaties worthwhile. Should you force upon us a [new] treaty, whose provisions totally ignore our hallowed folkways, popular opinion here would reject it. We would fall to chaos and our people would suffer the horrors of war. Then what good would the treaty of peace and amity be? Thus we should devise treaties carefully suited to each other's spiritual make-up, so that both sides benefit.⁴⁷

So far the bakufu had bent over backward to accommodate Harris. It had yielded on numerous crucial points: relaxing ancestral laws to open ports other than Nagasaki, letting Harris reside in Japan and have a shogunal audience in Edo, and allowing trade and residence to foreigners in other ports. Harris was endangering the bases of political order in Japan by forcing such concessions on the bakufu--all of which violated hallowed Japanese laws and ran counter to Japan's immutable Heavenly endowed folkways. "To achieve the purpose behind the [first] treaty (*washin*)," Aizawa held, "both sides must make concessions."⁴⁸

It was now time for Harris to yield on a few points, including

his demands for the freedom to propagate Christianity and for the opening of sensitive areas like Hyogo and the Kinai to foreign trade and settlement:

To open these without [court] approval would invite insurrection and civil war. If the American barbarians insist on this point, they would only be provoking civil war in Japan; and there would have been no purpose in signing a treaty of peace and amity in the first place.⁴⁹

Bakufu negotiators should explain Edo's predicament in these terms, Aizawa argued; then the dictates of reason (*jori*) would be crystal clear to Harris. Should he persist in trying to extract unreasonable concessions, "all the world's nations could tell without a doubt which side was right, and which, crooked."⁵⁰

Given Harris' persistence, and in view of how other Western powers were behaving in China, this statement of principle would mean little unless the bakufu was willing to risk an immediate military showdown. But it wished to avoid precisely that. Hotta, for example, had been painfully aware that "because America is the world's strongest nation, ... any lame effort to expel them by force would lead to defeat and national humiliation."⁵¹ Nariaki too felt constrained to support Hotta's plan "to dilly-dally and be evasive" (*burakashi*).⁵² By this he meant to grant the foreigners' demands for opening Japan until the strength to expel them, it was hoped, somehow could be cultivated. Edo leaders would have to promise the court that, although the bakufu had let foreigners into Japan, it was preparing earnestly to drive them back out. Nariaki died in 1860, before this double-dealing had discredited the bakufu in both foreign and Japanese eyes. Aizawa was not so lucky.

In 1862, one year before he would die, Aizawa was a frustrated old man fretting over the bakufu's future. Fifteen years earlier he had been much more of an optimist. He had welcomed news of America's liberation, a victory won by Washington after seven years of resolute fighting against the colonial power, Britain. The emergence of America and other independent republics, Aizawa had hoped, signaled the decline of Western territorial expansion around the globe. These former colonial peoples might aid the bakufu by halting their old European masters. But Perry dispelled all these hopes in 1853 and 1854. Aizawa realized that the United States was no different from other Western barbarian states making incursions in East Asia. By appealing to reason and to the Confucian-inspired theory of Heavenly Providence, Aizawa hoped that he could persuade the Americans to go away, so that Japan's natural economy of perfect

self-sufficiency and her natural condition of political seclusion would not be impaired. After all, Heaven had had a reason for denying foreign trade and diplomacy to the Japanese. But this hope too proved delusive, for Harris and his countrymen would not be dissuaded in 1858.

Aizawa then tried to apply the traditional Chinese diplomatic technique of controlling powerful barbarian states by binding them to treaty provisions that guaranteed mutual benefits and bilateral concessions. Such a loose rein policy would blunt the more dangerous foreign demands by placing foreign heads of state under legal restraints as spelled out in treaties. But this tactic failed too. By 1862, Westerners were in Japan to stay, and they were demanding even more privileges. The bakufu's legitimacy rested on its pledge to expel these foreigners--a pledge it could not keep. By 1862 Edo leaders had to convince a xenophobic court and bellicose samurai activists that the bakufu's opening of Japan was actually beneficial, not just unavoidable. Aizawa tried to provide such a rationale in his "Policy for Affairs of the Day" (*Jimusaku*). He wrote this tract to enlighten young Mito extremists in 1862, and he might possibly have intended to submit it Tokugawa Yoshinobu, then shogunal regent.⁵³

In this tract, Aizawa asserted that important national policies such as banning or permitting foreign trade and diplomacy had to be based on a realistic assessment of the times and of the strength of foreign nations. In Ieyasu's day, foreign nations were weak and Christianity posed no grave peril. So "he did not cut diplomatic ties with all nations; he kept them with some." Only because of the Shimabara Rebellion in 1637--after Ieyasu's death--did the bakufu end diplomatic relations with all nations and institute its seclusion policy. This stern measure was "appropriate for those times," because bakufu leaders in the 1630s judged that the danger of Christianity was life threatening and that Westerners were too weak to challenge Japan militarily. In other words, having failed to rationalize bakufu policy-making through metaphysical principles like Heavenly Providence, Aizawa turned to arguments of political expedience and historical relativism. Seclusion and the expulsion of Westerners were not immutable "hallowed laws" established by the all-wise Ieyasu at the very outset of Tokugawa rule. A latter-day bakufu had adopted those measures, and only because they met the needs of its time; so the present-day bakufu should not cling blindly to them. Policies adopted out of expedience in one era could be dropped without qualms in another, when changed historical conditions made them inappropriate.⁵⁴

But most important about Aizawa's "Policy for Affairs of the Day"--and this sets him apart from Nariaki and other Mito ideologues--is the assertion that Japan must openly admit military

inferiority to Westerners and act discreetly toward them. Aizawa explicitly repudiated the jingoistic rhetoric of his 1825 *New Theses*, which was now a bible for fanatic expulsionists. Edo leaders should not imitate Yueh Fei (1103-41), the rashly resolute Sung general and war-party leader who insisted on resisting Jurchen invaders to the bitter end. Japan's fighting men should not just battle to the death without caring whether the nation survived or perished. "Defeat would be a national disgrace," he declared. "We would have to sue for peace. The Westerners customarily demand indemnities to cover their war costs, and these would be more than we could pay." His explanation went on:

The foreign nations are immensely powerful, and all states in the world submit to a confederation. This is like when Duke Huan of Ch'i [r. 685-643 B.C.] and Duke Wen of Chin [r. 636-628 B.C.] were confederation masters in the Spring and Autumn period. All lords of the realm entered into relations of friendship. If any refused to submit, all the rest would attack him, and he would be unable to maintain his state's independence for a single day. The situation now is similar. If we refuse to enter into friendly relations, we will make all foreign states our enemies and will not be able to maintain independence among them.⁵⁵

Aizawa sought to rationalize Japan's submission to superior Western military might through this clever distortion of early Chinese history. Membership in the Chou confederation he cites was not coerced. And under the hegemon Huan and Wen, the confederation's chief purpose was not to suppress fighting among its members. Instead, the small states of the north China plain, then fearful of stronger barbarian neighbors such as Ch'u to the south, approached Ch'i and Duke Huan for protection. So it was due to their appeals that this league of Chinese states under nominal Chou rule came into being.⁵⁶ A more correct historical analogy would have been to compare the United States and other Western powers to Ch'u, and to liken Japan's daimyo domains under bakufu hegemony to the Chinese feudal lords who allied to defend themselves against barbarian encroachment. Aizawa resorted to this historical ruse in order to gloss over the bakufu's military impotence and inability to preserve Japan's territorial integrity. This is a far cry from his earlier views of controlling the barbarians: now they are controlling Japan. Though insisting that treaty concessions be bilateral and benefits be mutual, Aizawa would not risk war to make the West keep its half of the bargain.

Conclusion

In the 1840s and 1850s, before overseas travel enabled the Japanese to study world affairs and Western conditions first-hand, many Tokugawa thinkers relied on Chinese sources of information to learn about the barbarian menace facing them, and some employed traditional Chinese diplomatic practices to forestall it. Most rallied to the clarion call, "revere the Emperor and expel the barbarians." Most have been hailed as national heroes by prewar Japanese historians, and most have been denounced as early proponents of Emperor-state nationalism by postwar Japanese historians. Aizawa would seem to qualify on both counts. But few postwar scholarly books and articles have been devoted to his thought in the period 1826 to 1863--after he wrote *New Theses*.⁵⁷ And strangest of all, no prewar multi-volume *Complete Works* exists for him. In the ultra-nationalistic 1930s and 1940s, Japanese publishers eagerly printed and sold the collected works of far less eminent late Tokugawa xenophobes. Why has Aizawa suffered such cruel neglect?

This chapter indicates that the strategic thinking which emerges from Aizawa's post-1825 unpublished writings would have sullied forever his reputation as the Japanese Spirit incarnate. His views on late Tokugawa foreign policy resemble those of late Ch'ing officials such as Ch'i Ying and I-li-pu: open the country to Western semi-colonial domination in return for concessions to help bolster a tottering regime against domestic opposition. The resemblance lies in Aizawa's loose rein tactic for mollifying barbarian states: bind them to treaty provisions designed to benefit both signatories. Whether based on genuine naivete or (more likely) crass opportunism, this credulous faith in treaties signed with Westerners reveals the limits of Aizawa's xenophobia and sets him apart from other contemporary advocates of Japanese nationalism. Aizawa could not conceive of Japan's sovereignty and national autonomy apart from bakufu rule. He at first welcomed news of America's independence. But he did so in the hope, shared with late Ch'ing strategists such as Wei Yuan and Hsu Chi-yu, that America and other newly liberated peoples would help check the European imperialist advance in East Asia, and so reduce dangerous foreign pressures on the Edo regime. When he discovered that Perry and Harris were in the vanguard of that advance and would not be put off by sophistry, he ended up advocating little more than appeasement.

1. One of the first to stress this point was Osatake Takeki, *Kinsei Nihon no kokusai kannen no hattatsu* (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 51-52.
2. John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, 1968).
3. Morris Rossabi, ed., *China Among Equals* (Berkeley, 1983). For a recent study which interprets the transformation of nineteenth century Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan within Wallerstein's comparative framework of "modern world systems," see Nagai Kazu, "Higashi Ajia ni okeru kokusai kankei no hen'yo to Nihon no kindai," in *Nihon shi kenkyu*, no. 289 (September 1986), pp. 102-129.
4. For a seminal revisionist thesis on Tokugawa foreign policy within the East Asian context see Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan* (Princeton, 1984).
5. Quoted in Lien-sheng Yang, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order," in Fairbank, ed., *Chinese World Order*, pp. 23. Also, Gungwu Wang, "The Rhetoric of Lesser Empire," in Rossabi, *China Among Equals*, pp. 46-65.
6. On the *Phaeton* Incident, see Tabohashi Kiyoshi, *Zotei kindai Nihon gaikoku kankei shi* (Tokyo, 1937), pp. 275-281; Tokutomi Iichiro, *Kinsei Nihon kokumin shi* 25, *bakufu sekkin jidai* (Tokyo, 1936), pp. 362-376.
7. Numata Jiro et al., ed., *Nihon shiso taikai* 64, *yogaku, jo* (Tokyo, 1976), p. 560. (Hereafter cited "NST".)
8. For a more detailed analysis of Aizawa's strategic thinking in *New Theses*, see B. T. Wakabayashi, *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 58-134.
9. See Fred W. Drake, *China Charts the World: Hsu Chi-yu and His Geography of 1848* (Cambridge, 1975), p. 4.
10. See Paul A. Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 93-96.
11. Aizawa Seishisai, *Chishima ibun*, manuscript held by Mukyukai bunko (Machida-shi, Tokyo).
12. Imai Usaburo et al., eds., *NST* 53, *mitogaku* (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 103-104. This is Aizawa's amplification of Su's original statement quoted in Kenneth Ch'en, "Matteo Ricci's Contribution to, and Influence on, Geographical Knowledge in China," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 59, no. 3 (September 1939), p. 349.
13. However, Watanabe and Takano estimated English power to be much greater than did Aizawa. See Sato Shosuke et al., eds., *NST* 55, *Watanabe Kazan, Takano Choei, Sakuma Shozan, Yokoi Shonan, Hashimoto Sanai* (Tokyo, 1971), p. 24 and pp. 167-168.
14. Quoted in Sato Shosuke, *Yogaku shi kenkyu josetsu* (Tokyo, 1964), pp. 315-316.
15. Sir Ernest Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan* (Rutland, Vermont, 1983), p. 44.
16. Aizawa Seishisai, *Kagaku jigen* (Mito, 1892), p. 82.
17. In his *Kagaku jigen* of 1847, Aizawa cites "A Dutch book translated by Mitsukuri Shogo" ("Mitsukuri Shogo yaku ransho"): Aizawa, *Kagaku jigen*, p. 90. *Kon'yo zushiki* was published under the name of Mitsukuri Shogo, but according to Kure Shuzo, it was largely a product of Shogo's adoptive father, Mitsukuri Gempo. See Rangaku shiryō kenkyū kai, ed., *Mitsukuri Gempo no kenkyū* (Kyoto, 1978), pp. 186-187. I have used the 1845 woodblock edition of *Kon'yo zushiki* held by the Harvard Yenching Library.
18. Aizawa's hand-copied manuscript, "Amerika soki," is held by the Kodokan in Mito. I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Yoshida Toshizumi of the Ibaraki-ken rekishi kan in Mito for his assistance in allowing me to gain access to this key document and for helping me photograph it.
19. Studies on Wei Yuan which I found helpful are Peter M. Mitchell, "The Limits of Reformism: Wei Yuan's Reaction to Western Intrusion," and Susan Barnett, "Protestant Expansion and Chinese Views of the West," both in *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2 (April 1972); also Jane Kate Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World* (Cambridge, 1984), and Peter M. Mitchell, "Wei Yuan (1794-1857) and the Early Modernization Movement in China and Japan," (Ph.D.

dissertation, Indiana University, 1970).

20. Aizawa, *Kagaku jigen*, p. 97.

21. *Loc. cit.*

22. *Loc. cit.* Aizawa's Chinese phrase is "huai-jou yuan-jen."

23. Aizawa, *Kagaku jigen*, p. 96.

24. *Loc. cit.*, for the term "kyowaseijishu." However, Mitsukuri designated the United States nation as a "kyowaseijishu," his translation of the Dutch term "free new states." See *Kon'yo zushiki, maki no yon, ge*. Aizawa uses the term generically, to designate all the newly established republics.

25. Information and quotations in the following paragraphs derive from Aizawa's hand-copied manuscript, "Amerika soki."

26. Aizawa, *Kagaku jigen*, p. 96.

27. For the U.S. population figure, Aizawa, *Kagaku jigen*, p. 96; for the Japanese, p. 83.

28. "Gasshukoku suishi teitoku ni fukusuru no sho" to Perry, and "Gasshukoku daitoryo ni kotaure no sho" to Fillmore. Both are manuscripts in *Seishisai bunko*, held by Mukyukai bunko (Machida-shi, Tokyo).

29. Found in W. G. Beasley, *Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: 1853-1868* (London, 1955), pp. 101-102.

30. Aizawa, "Gasshukoku suishi teitoku ni fukusuru no sho."

31. *Loc. cit.*

32. The text of Fillmore's message is in Beasley, *Select Documents*, pp. 99-101.

33. This and the following paragraphs derive from Aizawa, "Gasshukoku daitoryo ni kotaure no sho."

34. "Arai Chikushu Romajin o satosu sho ni gisu," a manuscript in *Seishisai bunko*, held by Mukyukai bunko (Machida-shi, Tokyo).

35. *Loc. cit.*

36. On how Kaempfer's *History of Japan* strengthened the argument in late Tokugawa to keep Japan closed, see Kobori Keiichiro, *Sakoku no shiso* (Tokyo, 1974).

37. Aizawa, "Arai Chikushu Romajin o satosu sho ni gisu."

38. *Loc. cit.*

39. Copies of Aizawa's letters from 1856 to 1862 are held by the Tokyo University Historiographical Institute (Tokyo, Japan).

40. See the classic study by John K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast* (Stanford, 1969), pp. 84-113.

41. An English translation of the Japanese text of Harris' speech is in Beasley, *Select Documents*, pp. 159-165.

42. Mario Emilio Cosenza, ed., *The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris* (Rutland, Vermont, 1959), pp. 495-496.

43. Ishii Takashi, *Nihon kaikoku shi* (Tokyo, 1972), p. 256.

44. Cosenza, *Journal of Townsend Harris*, p. 495.

45. For a recent account, see Yoshida Masahiko, "Bogo mitchoku mondai to shimpanteki koki mitogaku," in *Nihon rekishi*, no. 404 (January 1985), pp. 86-103. For an older, less satisfactory account, see Tanaka Mitsuaki, ed., *Mito bakumatsu fuunroku* (Mito, 1976), pp. 233-252.

46. *Mito han shiryo johen ken* (Tokyo, 1970), p. 690.

47. Aizawa Yasushi *fujiko*, manuscript held by the Tokyo University Historiographical Institute (Tokyo, Japan).

48. *Loc. cit.*

49. *Loc. cit.*

50. *Loc. cit.*

51. *Mito han shiryo johen ken* (Tokyo, 1970), p. 19. These are the words of Tsutsui Masanori and Kawaji Toshiakira. But as Ishii Takashi notes, because they were aides to Hotta Masayoshi, it is valid to assume that Hotta shared these sentiments and also advocated the same *burakashi* policy (see the following note) to deal with the foreign crisis; see Ishii, *Nihon kaikoku shi*, p. 7.

52. *Mito han shiryo johen ken*, pp. 19-20. The slang term "*burakashi*" means "to stall," but as Toyama Shigeki interpolates, the connotation is clearly "to be evasive and to deceive"; see Toyama Shigeki, *Meiji ishin to gendai* (Tokyo, 1968), p. 65.

53. The text is included in Imai *et al.*, eds., *NST 53, mitogaku*, pp. 362-367. See also Seya Yoshihiko's "Kaidai" in the same volume, pp. 504-506.

54. *Loc. cit.*

55. Imai *et al.*, eds., *NST 53, mitogaku*, pp. 362-362.

56. See, for example, Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past* (Stanford, 1975), pp. 35-37.

57. The only study I know of dealing with Aizawa's thought after *New Theses* is Yamaguchi Muneyuki, "Bannen no Aizawa Seishisai," in Yamaguchi, *Bakumatsu seiji shiso shi kenkyu* (Tokyo, 1967).